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Over the years plenty of attention has been paid to how much the Department of 
Defense spends annually in the form of reports and studies.  However, very little attention 
has been given to the area of reprogramming.  This paper seeks to answer one main 
question: what is the nature of Defense Department reprogramming?  In answering this 
question, a specific methodology for describing reprogramming information was 
developed.  The benefits of this study are to highlight the use of reprogramming and 
provide a baseline of knowledge about an area of research where previously there was 
none.  This study found that the amount of reprogramming increased over 60 percent 
over the eight year period studied.  While the total amount reprogrammed increased, 
reprogramming as a percentage of total budget authority remained relatively constant.  
The majority of the increase came from an increase in prior approval reprogramming 
actions.  In general, there was very little congressional resistance to the reprogramming 
requests and there were definite patterns as to when reprogramming was done throughout 
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Defense spending and issues surrounding it receive significant attention, yet little 
attention has been given to the subject of reprogramming.  Reprogramming, broadly 
defined, is when a government agency moves funds intended by the Congressional 
Appropriations for one purpose to pay for some other purpose (not originally intended).  
Some reprogramming actions are allowed to be conducted within the Department of 
Defense (DoD) without outside approval, while others require specific permission from 
Congress.  At times gaining that permission can involve a tug-of-war between the 
executive and legislative branches. 
The current administration has talked about the need for flexibility in its budget 
execution, and reprogramming is one of the few tools the executive branch has (Spiegel, 
2007).  Reprogramming allows the executive branch to move funds to where they believe 
they can best be utilized.  Without reprogramming, the executive branch would be forced 
to execute the budget as appropriated by Congress, whether the appropriations were well-
written or not.  Budgets are prepared at least a year prior to execution and oftentimes 
requirements change prior to budget execution.  Reprogramming funds also allows the 
executive branch to make course corrections during the execution phase of budgeting. 
The idea of reprogramming has been around for decades, yet no studies have 
delved into any specifics about the topic.  Jones and Bixler (1992) included the amount of 
reprogramming done in a given year, but to date there has not been an in-depth analysis 
of what is being reprogrammed or when reprogramming is occurring.  This thesis looked 
deeper into DoD reprogramming to find trends and relationships.  The information 
presented herein not only provides an update of how much has been reprogrammed in 
recent history, but it also gives a deeper look and paints a picture of how and what has 
been reprogrammed in recent history.  It is the how and what of reprogramming that has 
up to this point not been studied and this thesis fills that void. 
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B.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
While many aspects of federal budget execution have been studied over the years, 
reprogramming within DoD has been relatively neglected.  Only two works with any 
tangential relationship to reprogramming were identified.  Fisher did an excellent job in 
describing the history of reprogramming and its origins.  Fisher also described the 
amount of money reprogrammed between the 1950’s and 1970’s as well as the number of 
reprogramming actions annually (Fisher, 1975).  Jones and Bixler outlined the number of 
actions and the amount of money reprogrammed for the period between 1968 and 1990 
(Jones and Bixler, 1992).  Other than these two works that included some rudimentary 
reprogramming statistics, no significant study of reprogramming has been undertaken and 
this study attempts to begin to fill this void. 
This study analyzes archival records from the DoD Comptroller’s web page of 
reprogramming and transfer actions.  Most of the data in this study originated from that 
source.  Appropriations data were collected from the Library of Congress website.  
Descriptive statistics were applied to the data and used in the analysis of reprogramming 
actions.  The analysis of reprogramming was broken down by both the magnitude and 
frequency of reprogramming actions. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary question to be answered in this research is “what is the nature of 
Defense Department reprogramming?”  Each year Congress appropriates funds through 
various appropriations to the Defense Department for maintaining defense capabilities 
and conducting operations.  After these funds have been appropriated, using various 
processes the Defense Department can move or reprogram the money to different 
appropriations to meet department goals and objectives.  This thesis attempts to capture 
overall trends with the process of reprogramming.  The uncovering of trends will allow 
future leaders to identify areas which may be improved, such as the budgeting process. 
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
• How many different reprogramming actions occur annually and what are 
the typical dollars involved? 
• Are there specific periods throughout the year when reprogramming 
actions are performed? 
• What are the major categories of reprogramming? 
• Which accounts are most frequently involved with reprogramming? 
• How frequently does Congress approve reprogramming actions, and what 
portion of actions are marked? 
Understanding the effects of reprogramming requires that two dimensions be 
analyzed, magnitude and frequency.  The magnitude of reprogramming is a description of 
the amount of funds involved in reprogramming actions.  The magnitude was determined 
by finding the typical dollar value involved with reprogramming actions.  The frequency 
describes how often reprogramming actions are used.  Frequency was determined by 
observing how many reprogramming actions occur annually.  Together, magnitude and 
frequency tell the story of how much reprogramming is done annually. 
The federal government operates with a fiscal year beginning 1 October.  
Reprogramming occurs throughout the year.  Are there specific times throughout the year 
when reprogramming occurs more than at other times?  If so, when are there more 
reprogramming actions and what are the possible reasons for differences?   
Not all reprogramming actions are of the same type.  Some require congressional 
approval while others do not.  What are the categories of reprogramming and how are 
they distinguished?  What are the criteria used to determine which category will be used?  
Knowing the types and their criteria for use allows a better understanding of the process 
used to approve them. 
Reprogramming affects all types of defense appropriations.  One would expect 
reprogramming actions to affect some appropriations more than others.  Determining 
which appropriations’ funds are reprogrammed more often may lead to development of 
policies or involvement at higher levels to further study why.  Understanding which 
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appropriations are affected more often may allow leaders to dig into the causes and 
determine root causes for the reprogramming needed. 
Some reprogramming actions require Congressional approval before they can be 
implemented, and sometimes Congress doesn’t approve the reprogramming.  This 
research determined how often reprogramming actions were not approved.  Congress also 
has the option of changing the amount requested in the reprogramming action.  The study 
explains how often and how much Congress changed the amounts requested.  The 
knowledge of how often, how much and which types of accounts Congress does not 
approve in full may allow the services to predict which requests are likely to be approved 
and manage for the situation where reprogramming requests are likely to be denied by 
Congress. 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
All reprogramming actions reported by DoD during the time period from 1999 to 
2006 were studied.  Characteristics studied included the number of reprogramming 
actions annually, amount of money reprogrammed annually and frequency of 
congressional resistance.  This study is intended to be descriptive only.  This study does 
not delve into why certain funds are reprogrammed, but does offer some suggestions as to 
the reasons for the nature. 
The research is broken into three areas.  The first area focuses on describing 
reprogramming action amounts and frequency.  This thesis provides an updated view on 
the amount of money involved in DoD reprogramming.  Specifically, the amount of 
money reprogrammed for each year from 1999 to 2006 is included.  The study was 
limited to these years based upon data availability.  The amount of money reprogrammed 
into and out of each appropriation type was studied.  The complexity and magnitude of 
reprogramming actions was also investigated. 
In addition to determining how much was reprogrammed, investigation into when 
reprogramming occurred in relation to the fiscal year and the dates appropriations were 
passed was done.  The research also investigated whether there were any trends 
associated with the fiscal year of the money involved and the year in which it was 
 5
reprogrammed.  Along the same lines, the research looked at how frequently money 
whose obligation period had expired was reprogrammed. 
The last area of study focuses on congressional involvement in the 
reprogramming process.  Some reprogramming actions require specific congressional 
approval.  Determination of how frequently Congress denies reprogramming requests 
was studied.  Sometimes Congress only partially approves reprogramming requests and 
the study attempts to determine how much Congress typically cuts.  The research also 
attempts to determine if there are any patterns of behavior with reference to rejecting 
reprogramming requests. 
E. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
The term “defense committees” is used in this research to describe the committees 
that review and approve reprogramming requests.  For reprogramming actions that do not 
involve items associated with intelligence programs or intelligence related activities the 
defense committees consist of the House Appropriations Committee, Senate 
Appropriations Committee, House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed 
Services Committee.  For those reprogramming actions that do involve items associated 
with intelligence programs or intelligence related activities the defense committees 
consist of the four committees already mentioned and the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees. 
In this study the term “reprogramming” takes on a particular meaning.  In the 
classical sense reprogramming refers only to the shifting of funds within an 
appropriation.  The term “transfer” refers to shifting of funds between appropriations.  
Reprogramming for the purposes of this study means any action that moves funds 
intended for one purpose to another (Fisher, 1975).  In this study the term 
“reprogramming” consolidates the classical definitions of reprogramming and transfers.     
For the purposes of this study the term “reprogramming year” has been developed 
and is abbreviated as RY.  This term was developed to distinguish between the time when 
the funds were reprogrammed and the fiscal years of the funds involved.  The DoD 
Comptroller catalogues reprogramming actions by fiscal years, yet the dates stamped on 
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the reprogramming actions do not always fall into the normal governmental fiscal year.  
For instance, a reprogramming action listed under the 2006 fiscal year could be dated 
October 15, 2006.  This oddity comes about as a result of when the dates are put on the 
documents.  The dates are not stamped on the documents until after the defense 
committees have acted upon them and in some cases this is after the new fiscal year has 
started.  It is presumed that the actions were initiated prior to the end of the fiscal year. 
Abbreviations used in this study: 
• O&M: Operations and Maintenance 
• MILPERS: Military Personnel 
• RDT&E: Research, Development, Testing and Engineering 
• MILCON: Military Construction 
• DoD: Department of Defense 
• HAC: House Appropriations Committee 
• HASC: House Armed Services Committee 
• SAC: Senate Appropriations Committee 
• SASC: Senate Armed Services Committee 
• USD (C): Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Four more chapters follow this chapter.  In the next chapter, “Background,” a 
brief history and a thorough description of the reprogramming process is presented.  In 
the following chapter, “Methodology,” the process in which this thesis was conducted is 
presented.  The fourth chapter, “Presentation of Results,” presents the information 
learned in a concise, straightforward manner.  The last chapter, “Analysis and 
Conclusion,” takes a broad view of the information presented in chapter four and gives an 
analytic description of the information presented. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. UNDERSTANDING REPROGRAMMING 
Before the nature of reprogramming can be determined, some perspective on 
reprogramming must be gained.  Understanding the history of reprogramming can put 
context on the subject.  Knowing the different types of reprogramming that are used and 
when they are used provides baseline knowledge for understanding the data that will be 
presented.  Learning the reasons why DoD reprograms funds also leads to a more 
thorough understanding of the reprogramming process. 
1. Historical Perspective on Reprogramming 
a. Source of Reprogramming 
The Constitution defines where the authority for spending lies as well as 
who is responsible for monitoring the spending.  Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution 
gives Congress the “power of the purse.”  Specifically, only Congress has the authority to 
enact a budget and it is responsible for overseeing budget execution.  Article I, Section 9, 
of the Constitution requires accountability over the use of public funds and provides 
Congress the power to require periodic reports from the executive branch to ensure public 
funds are utilized responsibly. 
Since Congress has the responsibility to monitor the spending of public 
funds, it makes sense that Congress requires either permission for, or notification of, 
instances when the executive branch uses funds differently than originally intended.  This 
is why at a minimum all reprogrammed funds must be reported to Congress as an internal 
reprogramming action or a tally of all below-threshold reprogramming transactions.  
Additionally, for larger items, or reprogramming actions that require special 
congressional attention, prior approval must be received from the defense committees.  It 
is interesting to note that it takes the full Congress to pass legislation to appropriate funds 
for use by the executive branch yet only the defense committees determine whether 
proposed reprogramming actions are accepted or changed. 
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b. Evolution of Reprogramming 
Reprogramming started in the 1790s.  Vigorous debate about whether or 
not transfers were legal occurred in 1793.  In 1794, Congress authorized the President to 
call out the militia but failed to appropriate funds in support of the operation.  When 
President Washington ordered the militia to carry out operations in October 1794, it was 
necessary to use funds that had been appropriated for something else.  Congress was not 
in session and the funds were transferred.  Some decried the move as illegal while others 
viewed the move as flexibility the executive branch needed (Fisher, 1975). 
The 19th century saw an ebb and flow of Congress’ willingness to allow 
transfers to occur.  An 1809 act declared that appropriated sums could only be used for 
the objects for which they were intended and no others.  In the very next breath though, 
Congress gave the President authority to transfer funds while Congress was in recess.  
The 1809 act was revised in 1820 to allow transfers by the President throughout the year, 
whether Congress was in session or not.  The revised act restricted transfers to certain 
military and naval department items.  In 1832, Congress authorized the President to direct 
money intended for one branch of the Navy to another branch (Fisher, 1975). 
Late passage of appropriation acts also contributed to the necessity of 
transfers.  During this period of time it was common for Congress to pass appropriation 
acts until two to five months after the fiscal year hard started.  In an 1833 report, the 
Secretary of the Navy informed Congress that it should either allow transfers to occur 
while the appropriation bills were pending or provide funding in the interim to allow the 
department to carryout necessary operations.  In 1834, Congress chose to allow the 
President to transfer funds in the period between the beginning of the fiscal year and the 
passage of appropriation bills (Fisher, 1975). 
The authority for the President to transfer naval funds was removed in 
1842 as a result of Congress’ belief that the Navy Department’s “improvidence, waste 
and extravagance” were the result of transfers.  However, these restrictions proved to be 
too much during the Mexican War.  An 1846 act authorized the President to transfer 
naval funds when circumstances required it.  The 1846 act did not allow the President to 
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transfer funds associated with naval yards.  In 1847 the restrictions expanded to include 
clothing funds but included authority to transfer up to $1.5 million of unexpended 
balances.  All of those authorities were repealed in 1852.  In 1868, Congress repealed all 
previous acts, reaching back to 1809, which authorized transfers (Fisher, 1975). 
Reprogramming in the 20th century was characterized once again by the 
tug-of-war between the legislative and executive branches.  The 20th century saw the 
introduction of the term “reprogramming” when it was introduced in 1912 in an article by 
W. F. Willoughby.  Willoughby recommended Congress stop writing appropriation bills 
in great detail and instead use large lump-sums to appropriate funds.  Willoughby’s 
recommendation did not include a method for congressional participation and was the 
likely reason his recommendation was not implemented (Fisher, 1975). 
The 1940’s saw considerable changes in reprogramming and transfer 
policy.  The Lend Lease Act of 1941 allowed the President to transfer as much as 20 
percent of the appropriations from one category to another provided no appropriation was 
increased by more than 30 percent.  During World War II, a gentlemen’s agreement 
between the War Department and appropriations committees required the War 
department to notify the appropriations committees and obtain their approval before 
shifting funds.  This agreement was the first time congressional approval was needed for 
the movement of funds within the same appropriation, what we call reprogramming today 
(Fisher, 1975). 
After World War II the practice of moving funds continued and increased 
until Congress decided it would reassert control of spending by introducing the 
performance budget in 1949.  The performance budget appropriated in lump-sums and 
reduced the number of appropriation accounts.  At the same time Congress began to 
require regular reporting and in some cases prior approval of reprogramming actions.  In 
1956 the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) produced a report, whose intent is the 
basis for reprogramming today.  The report stated that Congress understood the need to 
have flexibility in executing budgets while at the same time keeping control over 
spending.  The report required after-the-fact reporting of some reprogramming actions 
and prior approval for others (Jones and Bixler, 1992). 
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Only the amount of required congressional involvement has changed since 
the 1950’s.  Prior to 1961 only the defense appropriations subcommittees considered 
reprogramming and transfer requests.  In 1961 that changed when the Armed Services 
Committees became involved.  Before 1972 only the chairmen and ranking members of 
the defense appropriations subcommittees reviewed and approved reprogramming and 
transfer requests.  By 1974, concurrence of the full HAC defense appropriations 
subcommittee was required.  The same was true for the Senate Appropriations 
Committee (SAC) except that full subcommittee participation began in 1972.   
Today, no fewer than four Congressional committees review 
reprogramming requests.  The Congressional groups which act upon the reprogramming 
request are known as the defense committees.  The defense committees consist of the 
House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 
House Appropriations Committee (HAC) and Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC).  
If the request includes intelligence related issues, then the House and Senate Committees 
on Intelligence are included.  Each committee reviews the proposed reprogramming 
action.  Each committee may approve, deny, reduce or increase the amounts of funding 
changes requested.  Reprogramming actions which are approved are then sent back to 
USD (C). 
2. Types of Reprogramming 
DoD classifies reprogramming into four types: prior approval, internal, 
notification letter and below threshold.  Each type of reprogramming has its own 
characteristics and reasons for use.  Each is discussed in further detail below (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2001). 
a. Prior Approval Reprogramming 
Prior approval reprogramming is the movement of funds either within 
appropriations or between appropriations that requires approval by the four defense 
committees before implementation.  There are many different criteria that could require a 
prior approval reprogramming transaction.  If any of the criteria below are met then a 
prior approval reprogramming request must be submitted. 
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If a reprogramming action will increase the number of units of a major end 
item, then a prior approval action must be used unless specific congressional language 
allows additional quantities.  If the reprogramming action affects a congressional special 
interest item prior approval must be obtained unless the money is used for the same 
purpose.  If general transfer authority is used and the funds are not used for the same 
purpose then prior approval reprogramming must be used.  If the reprogramming exceeds 
thresholds specific to each appropriation then prior approval is required.  New starts, new 
line items and termination of programs, projects or subprojects exceeding specific 
thresholds all require prior approval reprogramming to be used (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2001). 
While four different types of reprogramming exist, DoD does not 
differentiate between reprogramming and transfers.  Technically speaking, 
reprogramming is the shifting of funds within an appropriation account.  Transfers are the 
moving of funds from one appropriation account to another.  When DoD reports 
reprogramming it makes no distinction and lists all actions as reprogramming actions.  
Instead, DoD groups reprogramming actions into two major groups: prior-approval 
reprogramming and internal reprogramming actions. 
When a component within the DoD desires to reprogram funds using the 
prior approval process, the following is the typical process followed.  First, military 
departments submit proposed reprogramming actions formally by memorandum to the 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).  The memorandum is 
required to be sent by the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller) 
of the military department.  If USD (C) agrees with the reprogramming request, the 
reprogramming request is signed.  If the USD (C) does not agree with the request, he/she 
may reject the proposal and the proposal is essentially dead.  After the request is signed it 
is forwarded to the defense committees in Congress (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001). 
Each of the defense committees considers the proposed action and acts on 
the proposed action.  Each committee may decide to approve the action in full, change 
the amounts requested or deny the action completely.  An action requires the approval of 
all committees involved.  If any one committee rejects part, or all of a requested action, 
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then it does not matter if the remaining committees accept the proposal.  The amount 
allowed to be implemented will be the smallest amount approved by all of the defense 
committees. 
Once the approved reprogramming action is received by USC (C), the 
amounts requested are compared to those approved by the defense committees.  If a 
transaction was reduced, only the lowest amount approved by all of the committees will 
be implemented.  Often times the defense committees only reduce the amount of funding 
sources but do not make any reductions to the amounts of requested increases.  In these 
cases it is up to the services and USD (C) to decide which items will receive increased 
funding and which will not.  Defense committees making reductions in this manner allow 
the services more flexibility to decide which programs will benefit.  The USD deputy 
comptroller then sends a memorandum to all affected components.  The memorandum is 
also sent to the USD (C) for program and budget managers so that funds may be released 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2001). 
In addition to the normal prior approval reprogramming actions submitted 
to the defense committees, every year there is an annual omnibus reprogramming action 
submitted.  It is usually submitted about the same time as the mid-year review.  The 
omnibus reprogramming action is designed to consolidate many reprogramming actions 
into a single document.  The single document allows the defense committees to consider 
many actions at once and reduce the number of actions they review. 
b. Internal Reprogramming 
Internal reprogramming is used for purposes similar to those of prior 
approval when the above criteria are not met.  Internal reprogramming is used to move 
funds to a different line item or appropriation so long as it does not change the purpose 
for which the money was originally intended.  Internal reprogramming is used to move 
funds from transfer accounts such as foreign currency or overseas contingency operations 
funds.  It can be used to approve increases to procurement quantities for major end items 
not otherwise requiring prior approval.  Internal reprogramming actions are used to  
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document transfers identifying specific line items when a letter notification is being used 
to satisfy congressional or specific transfer notification requirements (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2001). 
The internal reprogramming process is simpler than prior approval 
reprogramming process.  Because the dollar amounts are below certain thresholds or 
congressional interests are not involved, internal reprogramming actions are approved by 
the USD (C).  Service components make the request to reprogram funds to the USD (C).  
The USD (C) has final decision authority on whether to approve or disapprove the 
requested reprogramming action.  If approved, a memorandum is sent to affected 
comptrollers and USD (C) program and budget managers so funds can be released.  
Internal reprogramming actions are done to serve as an audit trail of the department’s 
actions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001). 
c. Letter Notification Reprogramming 
When DoD wants to reprogram funds to initiate a new start not requiring 
prior approval or modifications of an existing program below certain thresholds then a 
letter to the congressional committees explaining the reprogramming action is used.  The 
letter notification does not require any action by Congress, it is informative in nature.  
The notification letter is also used for terminations of projects or subprojects so long as 
the procurement line item is not eliminated.  The letter notification includes a description 
of the source funds and why they are no longer needed.  It also requires an explanation of 
how future year funding will be obtained if no specific budget line item is used.  Letter 
notifications can be implemented 30 days after the notification has been received by the 
defense committees unless notification to the contrary is received from one of the defense 
committees (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001). 
d. Below Threshold Reprogramming 
Below threshold reprogramming is reprogramming which occurs below 
threshold levels set by Congress.  DoD components conduct the reprogramming and keep 
a running tally of amounts reprogrammed by account.  Reports are submitted to Congress 
semi-annually detailing the actions taken (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001). 
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3.  Reasons for Reprogramming 
Reprogramming within the DoD occurs for many different reasons.  Developing 
an understanding of why reprogramming occurs should lead to a better understanding of 
what is taking place when it does occur.  Rather than seeing funds being moved from a 
procurement account to an operations and maintenance account as reprogramming in 
general, this understanding will allow the reader to have an idea as to why the funds were 
moved.  The reasons for why reprogramming is done are discussed next. 
Budgets are formulated many months and sometimes years before they are 
executed.  As a result there are bound to be inaccuracies associated with budget 
estimates.  Adjustments to wage rates or incorrect price estimates are examples of where 
inaccuracies would cause either a shortfall or an excess of funds.  In either case 
reprogramming is used to shift funds to better use the excess or to make up for the 
shortfalls (Fisher, 1975). 
On occasion military leaders decide to change requirements to maintain the 
military’s readiness.  During times of war this is often the case.  As equipment is depleted 
more equipment needs to be procured and presents a pressing requirement.  An example 
would be the decision to have more of one type of aircraft than another.  As a result of 
this type of decision, more aircraft of one type would need to be purchased while fewer 
of the other would be purchased.  In that case funds would need to be moved from one 
program to another.   
Sometimes when Congress puts together an Appropriations Act, it mistakenly 
funds a program in one appropriation when the funds should have been included in 
another appropriation.  A simple example would be providing O&M funds in a 
procurement appropriation.  When this type of situation occurs, DoD reprograms the 
funds into the appropriate procurement account to meet congressional intent. 
When the President’s Budget is submitted, Congress does not always agree with 
the proposed budget.  Congress may appropriate fewer funds than requested or increase 
the quantity of a major end-item.  When Congress appropriates to procure more 
equipment than requested it frequently does not consider the ramifications on operating 
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costs.  As a result, the amount originally requested no longer is enough to operate all of 
the equipment.  Another event that causes reprogramming is when Congress approves a 
wage increase above what was requested for DoD personnel but does not increase the 
amount designed to pay the personnel.  Consequently, money must be found in other 
programs and reprogrammed to pay for the unfunded pay increase. 
It may be the case that when budgets were being developed, poor or inadequate 
thought and insight were used.  Budgets are usually based on historical data.  However, 
when using historical data a comparison of past activities with planned future activities 
should be done.  If the planned activities represent a major shift from past activities then 
the historical data must be manipulated to account for the major shift.  If careful analysis 
is not done then the budgets for future activities are likely to be inaccurate. As a result, 
reprogramming may be required to make up for funding shortfalls or other funding issues 
(Fisher, 1975). 
Even when initial budget estimates are done in a rigorous manner, often it is the 
case that circumstances arise for which no plans were made.  When such an event occurs, 
funds must either be appropriated or reprogrammed to pay for the event.  In many cases 
both occur.  Frequently reprogramming of funds is done to pay for the immediate need.  
Then, when funds are appropriated for the event, money is once again reprogrammed to 
pay back the original funding source (Fisher, 1975). 
The normal defense appropriations are designed to design, train and equip our 
military for a high state of readiness.  They are not intended to fund wars and other 
conflicts.  When war does occur, operations are financed through supplemental 
appropriations.  Often the supplemental appropriations provide money in a single transfer 
account.  The money then has to be reprogrammed from the transfer account into the 
required accounts necessary to carry out operations. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
A. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Determining the nature of DoD reprogramming consisted of three steps.  The first 
step was collecting actual reprogramming data from a reliable source.  Other data such as 
DoD’s budget authority were needed to provide context to the data presented.  The 
second step was organizing the data into a useful presentation format.  The last step was 
describing and analyzing the data presented.  The last step ultimately describes the nature 
of DoD reprogramming. 
1. Sources of Data 
Finding a source for DoD reprogramming data was straightforward.  It was 
preferred the source of reprogramming data consist of actual reprogramming actions and 
not rely on secondary information.  Having source information documents allowed more 
information about each action to be gained.  The source used for this study was found on 
the website for the comptroller of the DoD. 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (USD (C)) maintains 
an online database for all reprogramming actions dating back to the 1999 fiscal year.  The 
reprogramming actions are stored as PDF files and separated by type (prior approval, 
internal and letter reprogramming actions).  This study only reviewed internal and prior 
approval reprogramming actions.   
Each reprogramming action filed had a wealth of information.  At the bottom of 
the first page the date in which the action was approved is stamped.  Reprogramming 
actions are organized first by the accounts receiving increases in funds, then by the fiscal 
year of the funds involved, followed by the appropriation type (e.g., Operations and 
Maintenance, Navy), and then budget activity (e.g., Budget Activity 1: Operating 
Forces).  Sometimes, the reprogramming action described the reprogramming even 
further by listing individual program elements.  Following the actual amounts of funds to 
be reprogrammed would be an explanation for the reprogramming.  Sometimes the 
explanation was very specific while at other times it was general in nature.  After all of 
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the accounts having funds increased were listed, the same sequence would follow for all 
account decreases.  An example of a reprogramming action is shown below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Prior approval reprogramming request 
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Each reprogramming action consisted of what have been termed as transactions.  
A reprogramming transaction consists of a single line of data that describes which 
appropriation account, which budget activity, fiscal year of the funds involved and the 
amount of funds requested.  For every reprogramming action there are at least two 
transactions: one transaction for the increase of funds and one transaction for the decrease 
of funds.  In most reprogramming actions there were multiple transactions for increases 
and decreases of funds to accounts.  Reprogramming actions having multiple transactions 
in each direction make it impossible to determine individual tradeoffs between programs 
if they exist at all. 
Another source of data used was the website for the Library of Congress.  The 
website www.thomas.gov provided information about appropriations.  Information such 
as the appropriation bill numbers and the dates the bills became laws was used.  Also, 
determining whether the appropriations were regular or supplemental was found from 
this source. 
The fiscal year 2008 budget was also used as a source of data.  Within the budget 
the Office of Budget and Management includes historical tables of a wide array of data 
from Federal Government finances.  The historical tables were used to determine the 
budget authority for the DoD in each of the years studied.  The budget authority was used 
to provide context as to how much of the DoD’s budget was actually reprogrammed. 
2. Organization of Data 
The organization of the data allowed relatively easy sorting and manipulation.  
The data were organized and sorted in an EXCEL workbook.  All reprogramming data 
from the USD (C) website were manually transcribed from the individual PDF files to an 
EXCEL workbook (one sheet per reprogramming year).  No easier method of collecting 
the data from the PDF files was identified. 
An EXCEL spreadsheet was built to organize and sort the data from all of the 
reprogramming actions.  The following data were collected from each reprogramming 
action when available: title of reprogramming action, date action was approved, 
appropriation account, budget activity, fiscal year of the funds involved, amount of funds 
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requested to be increased, amount of funds approved to be increased, amount of funds to 
be decreased and the amount of funds approved to be decreased.  Each transaction was 
entered into the spreadsheet on its own row.  The columns were used for each type of 
data as mentioned previously. 
Aside from the raw data contained in the reprogramming actions, additional data 
were derived.  A category of data labeled as “Mark Amount” was created for both 
funding increases and decreases.  A “mark” occurs when one of the congressional 
defense committees reduces the amount of funding originally requested.  A “mark” is 
annotated on a reprogramming request with a single line drawn through the original 
amount requested and the new approved amount is written in.  The “Mark Amount” 
column was calculated by taking the difference between the amount requested and the 
amount approved.  In addition to the “Mark Amount,” a “Percentage Marked” statistic 
was also derived.  The “Percentage Marked” represented the percentage of the original 
amount requested that was marked.  It was calculated by dividing the “Mark Amount” by 
the amount requested. 
The reprogramming data set consisted of all prior approval and internal 
reprogramming actions from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2006.  There were a 
total of 867 reprogramming actions: 659 were internal and 208 were prior approval 
reprogramming actions.  There were 7,026 transactions: 5,273 were internal and 1,753 
were prior approval transactions.  The dataset is available from the author or primary 
thesis advisor.  A sample is provided in the Appendix. 
3. Presentation of Data 
The development of a consistent method to present the data in a meaningful 
format was accomplished next.  The presentation of the data consists of four parts: the 
question to be answered, how the data were manipulated, the presentation of the data and 
then a description of the data presented.  Following this rubric ensured the information 
was presented in a consistent manner. 
Presenting a question to be answered for each set of data provides a reason as to 
why the data are being presented.  Background information relating to the question 
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provides context for the question.  Describing how the data were manipulated enables the 
reader to be able to replicate the results if so desired.  The presentation section describes 
the information shown in tables and figures within the paper.  This section describes what 
the columns of tables mean, description of axes, what colors on figures represent and 
what types of funds are involved.  The description section describes the data presented in 
the tables and figures.  This section provides an overall description of the information 
contained within and also describes highlights and trends within the information.  In 
some instances this section also gives plausible explanations for why the information 
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IV. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
A. FREQUENCY AND TIMING OF REPROGRAMMING ACTIONS AND 
TRANSACTIONS 
Before any in-depth analysis of reprogramming can occur, a foundation of basic 
knowledge must be laid.  This foundation must consist of an understanding of how often 
reprogramming occurs, when it occurs, what types of accounts are affected and how 
complex the reprogramming actions are.  The following sections provide that foundation 
and will be used to develop further studies in the arena of reprogramming.   
1. Distribution of Reprogramming Transactions 
a. Question 
If one assumes inaccurate budget estimates or fact-of-life changes result in 
reprogramming actions, then the distribution of reprogramming transactions among major 
appropriation types may imply how accurate budget estimates were and display which 
categories had significant fact-of-life effects.  Showing the trends of reprogramming 
transactions over the study period might help defense department officials focus their 
efforts on one type of appropriation or another.  Identification and description of trends in 
the number of transactions for the major appropriation categories will be a determined in 
the following sections. 
b. Data Manipulation 
The transactions of each reprogramming year were grouped into the 
following eight major appropriation categories: Operations and Maintenance, MILPERS, 
Procurement, RDT&E, MILCON/Housing, Revolving and Management Funds, 
Contingency Operations and other Transfer Funds, and other DoD Programs.  All 
transactions for each reprogramming year were included, including transactions from 
omnibus actions.  The numbers of transactions for each category were summed by 




The numbers of transactions for each type of appropriation per 
reprogramming year are displayed in Table 1 below.  Table 1 also shows the total number 
of transactions for each reprogramming year.  The number of reprogramming transactions 
as a percentage of total reprogramming transactions for the reprogramming year are 
shown in Table 2 below. 
  Reprogramming Year   
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
O & M 328 290 272 221 261 278 332 297 2279
MILPERS 108 89 88 119 101 113 133 137 888
PROCUREMENT 138 170 202 123 151 227 269 252 1532
RDT&E 96 111 130 78 115 89 172 134 925
MILCON/HOUSING 63 43 36 54 98 166 108 100 668
Revolving and 
Management Funds 17 18 17 17 27 38 32 12 178
Contingency 
Operations and Other 
Transfer Funds 20 27 16 21 20 45 48 21 218
Other DoD Programs 27 29 37 48 47 54 46 50 338
Total 797 777 798 681 820 1010 1140 1003 7026
Table 1 Number of Transactions by Appropriation and Year 
 
  Reprogramming Year   
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
O & M 41% 37% 34% 32% 32% 28% 29% 30% 32%
MILPERS 14% 11% 11% 17% 12% 11% 12% 14% 13%
PROCUREMENT 17% 22% 25% 18% 18% 22% 24% 25% 22%
RDT&E 12% 14% 16% 11% 14% 9% 15% 13% 13%
MILCON/HOUSING 8% 6% 5% 8% 12% 16% 9% 10% 10%
Revolving and 
Management Funds 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 3% 1% 3%
Contingency 
Operations and Other 
Transfer Funds 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 4% 4% 2% 3%
Other DoD Programs 3% 4% 5% 7% 6% 5% 4% 5% 5%





Overall the numbers of transactions varied from a low of 681 in 2002, to a 
high of 1,140 in 2005.  The numbers of transactions were fairly constant between 1999 
and 2001, before dipping in 2002 and then increasing slightly in 2003 and significantly in 
2004 and 2005 before retreating slightly in 2006.  More transactions between 2003 and 
2006 are likely a result of the Iraq War and operations in Afghanistan.  War operations 
are funded by supplemental appropriations placed in transfer accounts.  Funds are then 
moved via reprogramming to O&M and procurement accounts.  One might expect there 
to be more transactions such as these when supplemental appropriations are used such as 
during times of war. 
In every year reprogramming transactions associated with the Operations 
and Maintenance appropriation accounted for the largest percentage of transactions.  
O&M transactions ranged from a high of 41 percent of transactions in RY 1999 to a low 
of 29 percent of transactions in RY 2005.  For the entire study period O&M transactions 
made up about one-third of all transactions.  The general trend was that O&M 
transactions became a smaller percentage of total transactions.  While this may not seem 
consistent with more transactions needed for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan these 
additional transactions could possibly be used to assist in funding equipment, 
construction and other items not included in Operations and Maintenance. 
Transactions associated with procurement appropriations consistently 
made up the next largest percentage of transactions.  This may indicate that funding 
profiles are not stable or estimates are inaccurate.  It may also show that procurement 
accounts are used as funding sources or beneficiaries.  Procurement reprogramming 
transactions ranged between 17 and 25 percent of all reprogramming transactions for a 
given reprogramming year.  Overall, procurement reprogramming transactions were 22 
percent of all reprogramming transactions.  The percentage of procurement 
reprogramming transactions appears to be varied with no good apparent explanation. 
Reprogramming transactions associated with military personnel pay and 
RDT&E appropriations had about the same percentage of reprogramming transactions.  
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MILPERS transactions ranged between 11 and 14 percent for all years except 2002 
which was 14 percent.  Overall MILPERS transactions accounted for 13 percent of 
reprogramming transactions for the period studied.  RDT&E transactions ranged between 
9 and 16 percent of reprogramming transactions.  Overall, 13 percent of transactions were 
for RDT&E appropriations.  No overall trends are noted for RDT&E and MILPERS 
transactions other than the percentage appear to be fairly stable. 
Transactions associated with MILCON and Housing appropriations 
ranged between 5 and 16 percent; these representing 10 percent of reprogramming 
transactions overall.  There was significant variation in the percentage of transactions 
from year to year.  Overall, the trend seemed to be one of more transactions from 2003 
forward.  This was likely due to construction efforts associated with the Iraq War and 
operations in Afghanistan.  Operations in these areas required construction of facilities to 
house troops and provide bases from which to operate.  Another reason for the increase 
could be the privatizing of military housing. 
Reprogramming transactions associated with contingency operations and 
other transfer funds, revolving and management funds, and other DoD programs were 
relatively stable.  This was surprising given the operations ongoing in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  One would have expected a larger percentage of transactions to be from 
transfer funds.  An explanation is that in many reprogramming actions there are many 
transactions of funds going to various accounts with only one large transaction coming 
out of the transfer fund.  We will see later that the amounts of funds involved with 
transfer funds reflect this trend.  On average, reprogramming transactions for contingency 
operations and revolving and management funds were about the same, at 3 percent 
apiece.  Other DoD programs made up about 5 percent of all reprogramming transactions. 
2. Reprogramming Transactions by Fiscal Year 
a. Question 
The funds which are reprogrammed can be either current fiscal year funds 
or prior fiscal years.  Reprogramming of current year funds may indicate changes to 
reflect current priorities, “correcting” congressional actions, may be a byproduct of the 
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long lead time between budget formulation and execution, or may reflect poor planning.  
Reprogramming of previous fiscal years’ funds may indicate cost savings from a program 
or may simply be unused funds that are ready to expire; they cannot be used in their 
present form and are reprogrammed so the authority is not lost.  What portion of the 
reprogramming transactions for a reprogramming year is for the current fiscal year and 
what portion are for previous years?  Are there any trends associated with reprogramming 
prior years’ funds? 
b  Data Manipulation 
The transactions for each reprogramming year were first sorted by fiscal 
year.  Then the transactions for each reprogramming year were counted by fiscal year.   
c. Presentation 
The number of reprogramming transactions by fiscal year and 
reprogramming year are displayed in Table 3 below.  Fiscal years are listed along the 
vertical axis and reprogramming years are along the horizontal axis.  The values in the 
table represent the number of transactions in a reprogramming year for each fiscal year. 
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   Reprogramming Year   
  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
 2006 829        
 2005 89 870       
 2004 47 123 764      
2003 7 74 73 655     
2002 8 15 67 64 582    
2001 11 12 15 37 41 676   
2000 8 13 13 9 33 51 673  
1999 1 23 18 7 2 30 59 707
1998 1 2 21 11 3 6 30 47
1997 1 2 11 10 5  8 25
1996  4 11 6 1 8 1 4
1995 1 2 17 4 1  1 2
1994    17  4 1 4
1993     7 4  2
Fiscal Y
ear of Funds 
1992     1 8 1 1
 1991      5 1 1 
 1990     5 5  4 
 1989       2  
 1988           1     
 Total 1003 1140 1010 820 681 798 777 797 
Table 3 Transactions by fiscal year 
d. Description 
One can clearly see that transactions associated with the current fiscal year 
make up the largest portion (82%) of all of the transactions.  It makes sense that 
transactions in the current fiscal year would be the largest portion since reprogramming is 
used to account for fact-of-life changes and funding higher priority items.  Events 
occurring in the present can require changes in funding to account for those events.  
There are also likely to be more events affecting current funding requirements than past 
funding requirements. 
In every reprogramming year reprogramming transactions one year before 
the current fiscal year make up the second-largest number of transactions (8.7%).  
Transactions associated with one year-old money are comparatively frequent since 
present events are more likely to affect one year-old money than money from years even 
farther in the past.  Also, money that has only a one-year obligation period might be 
being swept up and used for other purposes whose obligation period has not expired or 
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does not exist.  In general, the number of transactions by fiscal year decreases with the 
number of years from the current fiscal year. 
One exception to the trend of decreasing reprogramming transactions with 
increasing time from the current fiscal year was the 2004 reprogramming year.  While 
fiscal years 2003 and 2002 displayed the typical reduction from previous fiscal years, the 
fiscal years prior to 2002 have an uncharacteristically large number of transactions 
compared to the other reprogramming years.  This may indicate an increased effort by 
DoD to look back and sweep up any available unused funds.  With the war dragging on 
and operations more complex than initially expected, the need for additional funds may 
have driven the reach-back for funds. 
3. Complexity of Reprogramming Actions 
a.  Question 
Reprogramming actions may be very complex or very simple.  Some 
reprogramming actions have many transactions while others only have a couple of 
transactions.  When there are more transactions in a reprogramming action it becomes 
difficult to directly link accounts as sources and beneficiaries.  When there are only a 
couple of transactions it is much easier for defense committees to see the tradeoffs being 
made.  More complex reprogramming actions may be used to make the decision for 
defense committees more difficult.  This practice may be done intentionally so that 
transactions, if they stood alone, would be unlikely to be approved are approved when 
there are many transactions. 
b. Data Manipulation 
The data were first grouped by reprogramming year.  Then the data were 
separated by action types (internal and prior approval reprogramming).  For each 
reprogramming year the average numbers of transactions per action were calculated.  
Internal and prior approval actions were grouped separately.  In the case of prior approval 
reprogramming actions, the omnibus reprogramming action was not included.  Instead, 
the number of transactions in each omnibus reprogramming action was listed separately. 
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c. Presentation 
The complexity of internal reprogramming actions is shown below in 
Table 4.  The first column shows the reprogramming year and the second column shows 
the number of internal reprogramming actions for that reprogramming year.  The third 
column displays the number of transactions within the internal reprogramming actions for 
that reprogramming year.  The last column is the average number of transactions for each 
internal reprogramming action for the reprogramming year. 
 
Reprogramming 
Year # of IR Actions 
# of IR 
Transactions 
Transactions per IR 
Action 
1999 73 687 9.4
2000 86 597 6.9
2001 80 582 7.3
2002 69 566 8.2
2003 71 651 9.2
2004 106 739 7.0
2005 116 839 7.2
2006 58 612 10.6
Total 659 5273 8.0
Table 4 Complexity of internal reprogramming actions 
 
The complexity of prior approval reprogramming actions is shown below 
in Table 5.  The first column shows the reprogramming year while the second column 
displays the number of prior approval reprogramming actions.  The third column includes 
all prior approval reprogramming transactions not included in the omnibus 
reprogramming action.  The fourth column is the arithmetic average of the number of 
transactions for each prior approval reprogramming action excluding the omnibus 
reprogramming action.  The last column shows the number of transactions in the annual 








# of PA 
Actions 






1999 13 42 3.2 68
2000 20 68 3.4 112
2001 32 98 3.1 118
2002 14 59 4.2 56
2003 26 94 3.6 76
2004 29 161 5.6 110
2005 46 173 3.8 128
2006 28 223 8.0 167
Total 208 918 4.4 835
Table 5 Complexity of prior approval reprogramming actions 
 
d. Description 
The number of internal reprogramming actions ranged from a low of 58 in 
2006, to a high of 116 in 2005.  Internal reprogramming transactions ranged from a low 
of 566 in 2002 to a high of 839 in 2005.  The average number of transactions for each 
internal reprogramming action ranged from a low of 6.9 in 2000 to a high of 10.6 in 
2006.  The average for all internal reprogramming actions for all years studied is eight.  
After the increasing trend, the average number of transactions dropped in 2004 and 
steadily increased through 2006. 
The results for prior approval reprogramming action’s complexity were 
different from those for internal reprogramming actions.  Prior approval reprogramming 
actions generally had fewer than half as many transactions as internal reprogramming 
actions.  The fewest prior approval reprogramming actions occurred in 1999, when there 
were only 13 actions.  In 2005, there were the most prior approval reprogramming 
actions, 46.  Prior approval transactions were at their lowest in 1999 with 42 and at their 
highest in 2006 with 223.  The average number of prior approval transactions per action 
ranged from a low of 3.1 in 2001 to a high of eight in 2006.  The overall average was 4.4 
transactions for each prior approval reprogramming action. 
The omnibus reprogramming actions were separated out from the 
remainder of the prior approval reprogramming actions because these actions are unlike 
any other prior approval reprogramming actions.  Inclusion of transactions from the 
omnibus reprogramming action would have distorted the findings.  The 2002 omnibus 
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reprogramming action had the fewest transactions with 56 while the 2006 omnibus 
reprogramming action had the most transactions with 167.  There were almost as many 
transactions in the omnibus reprogramming actions as there were in the remainder of the 
prior approval reprogramming actions.  There seemed to be great variability in the 
number of transactions in each omnibus reprogramming action.  The variability can be 
explained by the realization that each omnibus reprogramming action is different and the 
items addressed in each are unique. 
4. Timing of Reprogramming Actions 
a. Question 
Reprogramming is conducted throughout the fiscal year.  Every year 
annual appropriations bills are passed providing funding to DoD and in most years 
supplemental appropriations bills are passed to fund emergent requirements.  The annual 
defense appropriations are supposed to be passed before October 1st of the year but often 
are not.  When they are not passed on time, Congress may pass a continuing resolution 
providing some minimal funding to keep programs and offices operational.  However, 
DoD may uses reprogramming as a short-term tool to make up for funding shortfalls in 
the interim.  If this were the case one might expect to see some sort of correlation 
associated with the number of reprogramming actions and when appropriations bills are 
passed. 
b. Data Manipulation 
The first data manipulation was to separate the internal reprogramming 
actions from prior approval reprogramming actions.  Separating the types of 
reprogramming actions allowed each type to be analyzed separately.  Then for each type 
of reprogramming action the number of actions for each month starting in October 1999, 
were counted.  It did not matter if the action occurred at the beginning or end of the 
month.  If the date listed on the action was March 31, 2000 for example, then the action 




The times when prior approval and internal reprogramming actions were 
conducted are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively.  Along the x-axis is the 
month in which reprogramming actions occurred.  The y-axis shows the numbers of prior 
approval and internal reprogramming actions filed for the given month.  Appropriations, 
both regular and supplemental, are shown with a height of 25 so they are distinctive from 
the reprogramming actions.  The month in which regular appropriations were passed are 
displayed in green.  Supplemental appropriations are shown in red and prior approval and 



























































































































































































Figure 3 Frequency of internal actions by month 
 
d. Description 
There is a distinctive pattern associated with the timing of prior approval 
reprogramming actions.  About halfway between regular appropriations there are always 
more prior approval reprogramming actions than at any other time.  This pattern is 
evident even when the regular appropriations were passed late such as in January 2002.  
The pattern is likely caused by reviewing programs about halfway through the year and 
moving funds around to make adjustments in program execution. 
Another pattern evident with prior approval reprogramming actions was 
the absence of actions in October and November.  There were no prior approval 
reprogramming actions in any October and there were only two out of eight Novembers 
that had prior approval actions filed.  The lack of actions in October and November is 
probably caused by the anticipation or actual receipt of annual appropriations.  If the 
expectation is that funds are forthcoming then the services are likely reluctant to request 
the movement of funds to meet their needs. 
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In years when the annual defense appropriations bills were passed late 
there were always prior approval actions filed in the months immediately following.  In 
years when the annual defense appropriations were passed on time there were not prior 
approval actions filed in the months immediately following.  The actions following the 
late appropriations are likely caused by the movement of funds from one program to 
another to meet shortfalls when the annual appropriations are not passed on time.  Then 
when the annual appropriations are passed the funds are paid back to the original 
accounts that served as a funding source in the interim. 
Like prior approval actions, internal reprogramming actions had a higher 
number of actions about halfway between annual appropriations.  Unlike prior approval 
actions, there were internal reprogramming actions in October and November.  The 
months of October and November did, however, typically have fewer internal 
reprogramming actions than other months.  The reasons for the more internal 
reprogramming actions in between appropriations and fewer around October and 
November are likely similar to those for prior approval actions. 
It was interesting to note that in most months there were at least five 
internal reprogramming actions.  The higher number of internal reprogramming actions 
can be partly explained by the fact that internal reprogramming actions do not need 
congressional approval and therefore DoD does not hesitate to use them.  Internal 
reprogrammings probably also served to make the necessary fact-of-life adjustments to 
accounts. 
B. AMOUNTS ASSOCIATED WITH REPROGRAMMING 
This section provides an understanding of the amounts of funds associated with 
reprogramming.  This section continues to build the foundation of reprogramming 
knowledge started in the first section of this chapter.  This section details the amounts of 
funds moved into and out of accounts, gives a description of the typical amounts 
associated with each reprogramming type, describes the amounts of funds reprogrammed 
in each fiscal year and reprogramming year and goes on to provide a timeline for 
investment and operating accounts as they change throughout a reprogramming year.  
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This section, combined with the previous section gives a thorough understanding of the 
nature of DoD reprogramming for the last eight years.   
1.  Flow of Funds by Appropriation 
a.  Question 
When reprogramming occurs there is always a source and a recipient.  
While some reprogramming actions move funds within an appropriation account, many 
also move funds between appropriation accounts.  By looking at how much money 
flowed into and out of each appropriation a better idea of where the money goes may be 
gained.  A description of which accounts served as sources and recipients follows. 
b.  Data Manipulation 
The transactions from each reprogramming year were sorted by 
appropriation type.  The transactions of each appropriation type were grouped together to 
include all reprogramming years.  The amounts of funds approved to be added to 
accounts by the defense committees for each transaction were summed.  The amounts of 
funds approved to be subtracted from accounts by the defense committees for each 
transaction were summed.  Finally, the differences between the sums were calculated. 
c.  Presentation 
The amounts of funds transferred to and from each appropriation type are 
shown in Table 6 below.  The first column lists the appropriation type, the second column 
show the amounts transferred into the appropriations and the third column shows the 
amounts transferred from the appropriations.  The last column is the difference between 
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3,544,256  
     
21,246,124  
   
(17,701,868) 
Table 6 Funds reprogrammed into and out of appropriations 
 
d.  Description 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts had by far the most money 
transferred into them.  With over $181 billion transferred in, O&M accounts had more 
money transferred in than all other appropriations combined.  Overall, O&M accounts 
had $163 billion more transferred in than out.  A majority of these funds were likely used 
to fund operations in Iraq an Afghanistan. 
Contingency operations and other transfer funds had more than $161 
billion more transferred out than in.  This was expected due to the nature of contingency 
operation funds.  In these types of funds money is appropriated into them with the 
expectation that the money will be transferred out of them to fund requirements.  So by 
the very design of the transfer funds they should have significantly more transferred out 
than in. 
All appropriations had more money transferred in than out except for 
revolving and management accounts, contingency operations and other transfer funds and 
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other DoD programs.  It was not surprising to see most of the appropriations having more 
money transferred into them, mainly because of the period studied.  During this period 
(1999 to 2006) there have been numerous supplemental appropriations to fund war 
efforts. 
It was surprising to see that revolving and management funds had more 
than $10 billion transferred out than in.  It was expected that there would have been about 
the same amount transferred in as out.  The majority of the transactions either involved 
accounts associated with foreign currency fluctuations or working capital funds.  One 
explanation could be that working capital fund accounts had too much money in them 
and had to transfer some back to their customers.  Another could be that currency 
fluctuations were in the government’s favor and the additional funds were used to fund 
other requirements.  Yet another explanation is that in working capital funds there was 
higher business volume than expected.  Higher business volume would have led to excess 
cost recovery and money would have been available to be transferred out.  In either case, 
it was difficult to determine exactly the reason for more money flowing out of than into 
these accounts. 
2. Typical dollar values for a reprogramming action 
a. Question 
Not all reprogramming actions are alike.  Some actions involve millions of 
dollars while others are in the billions of dollars.  While the number of transactions 
showed how frequently funds were moved, the amount of money involved in a 
reprogramming action shows the magnitude of the action and indicates whether small 
adjustments or large, gross adjustments are being used to account for fact-of-life events.  
What are the typical amounts involved in reprogramming actions and are there any trends 
among the reprogramming years? 
b. Data Manipulation 
Reprogramming actions were first sorted by prior approval and internal 
types.  Transactions had either money going to an account or money coming from an 
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account.  To avoid double counting, only the dollar amounts approved by the defense 
committees to be added to accounts were summed for each reprogramming action.  The 
funds for all of the prior approval reprogramming actions for each reprogramming year, 
minus the omnibus prior approval reprogramming action, were summed, mean and 
quartiles calculated and median, minimum and maximum determined.  The same actions 
were applied to the internal reprogramming actions. 
c.  Presentation 
A breakdown of dollar amounts for all reprogramming actions is shown 
below in Table 7.  The table consists of three main sections; dollar amounts associated 
with internal reprogramming actions, dollar amounts associated with prior approval 
reprogramming actions and a total amount of reprogramming compared to DoD’s budget 
authority.  The column headings across the top are the reprogramming years.  The 
minimum, maximum, arithmetic mean and median dollar amounts are shown for both the 
internal and prior approval reprogramming sections for each year.  The quartile values for 
each type of reprogramming action were calculated and are presented. 
The dollar amounts associated with internal reprogramming actions by 
reprogramming year are shown in the first section of Table 7 below.  The “Total IR” line 
is the sum of all internal reprogramming action funds approved by the defense 
committees for the reprogramming year.  All values are in then-year thousands of dollars. 
In the prior approval section of Table 7 the line “Total PA” is the sum of 
all of the funds approved by the defense committees for the reprogramming year minus 
funds associated with the omnibus reprogramming action.  All values are in then-year 
thousands of dollars.  The dollar amount for the omnibus reprogramming action is shown 
separately. 
The last section of Table 7 gives a grand total of all reprogramming and 
compares it to DoD’s annual budget authority.  The grand total line is the sum of all 




reprogramming action.  The line “DoD BA” shows the DoD’s budget authority for each 
fiscal year.  The last line of the table shows the percentage of the DoD’s budget authority 
that was reprogrammed. 
 
  Reprogramming Year   
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
IR Actions           
           
Min  148 502  350 680 600 511 445  400 
Mean  193,081 140,207  153,298 239,985 251,911 153,562 123,235  238,609 
Median  43,294 14,421  11,609 12,224 29,650 30,445 21,750  51,260 
Max  2,250,296 2,206,030  2,840,923 6,700,000 4,734,462 2,163,538 1,810,000  3,048,686 
           
 1st Quartile  8,339 4,731  3,932 5,786 9,000 7,175 6,755  11,657 
 2nd Quartile  43,294 14,421  11,609 12,224 29,650 30,445 21,750  51,260 
 3rd Quartile  193,600 57,550  51,662 83,260 155,227 125,044 75,841  219,030 
 4th Quartile  2,250,296 2,206,030  2,840,923 6,700,000 4,734,462 2,163,538 1,810,000  3,048,686 
           
 Total IR  14,094,913 12,057,779  12,263,833 16,558,985 17,885,655 16,277,540 14,295,278  13,839,313 
 % of Total  93% 93% 79% 91% 85% 78% 59% 55% 
           
 PA Actions           
           
 Min  1,900 1,436  1,927 6 500 2,000 924  2,500 
 Mean  25,046 21,685  84,779 114,677 115,211 69,431 182,435  301,883 
 Median  16,450 17,000  14,700 36,329 28,800 25,600 42,000  80,000 
 Max  61,872 87,500  1,265,465 661,695 1,333,402 379,933 1,539,848  1,650,000 
           
 1st Quartile  11,779 3,148  7,397 24,500 5,700 10,174 13,760  44,100 
 2nd Quartile  16,450 17,000  14,700 36,329 28,800 25,600 42,000  80,000 
 3rd Quartile  36,221 25,824  27,582 87,250 45,919 80,732 150,000  360,150 
 4th Quartile  61,872 87,500  1,265,465 661,695 1,333,402 379,933 1,539,848  1,650,000 
           
 Total PA  300,557 412,015  2,628,144 1,376,120 2,880,279 1,944,054 8,209,584  8,150,839 
           
 Omnibus  775,813 469,028  633,193 283,834 289,578 2,686,197 1,602,789  3,153,234 
           
 Grand Total  15,171,283 12,938,822  15,525,170 18,218,939 21,055,512 20,907,791 24,107,651  25,143,386 
           

















           
 % of DoD 
BA  5.4% 4.5% 4.9% 5.3% 4.8% 4.4% 5.0% 4.2% 
Table 7 Typical dollar values for reprogramming actions 
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d.  Description 
For all reprogramming years the mean value was higher than the median 
value.  This indicates that a few very large actions pull the average up while numerous 
smaller actions hold the median down.  For prior approval actions in 1999 and 2000 the 
means were only slightly higher than the medians.  In all other years the means were at 
least three times as large as the medians. 
The total amount of internal reprogramming funds approved was relatively 
stable for all years.  The total amount of internal reprogramming ranged from $12.2 
billion to $16.3 billion.  Like prior approval reprogramming, internal reprogramming had 
means higher than the medians.  Unlike the prior approval reprogramming, however, the 
internal reprogramming does not have large increases in any years.  The lack of large 
increases might be a function of the limitations of internal reprogramming.  Perhaps the 
criteria that cause actions to be prior approval actions also limit large increases in internal 
reprogramming actions. 
Overall the amounts of money involved in prior approval reprogramming 
actions have increased substantially as Table 7 shows.  The total funds involved in 2006 
reprogramming actions were about 27 times larger than the amount of funds in 1999.  
The large increases seemed to happen in two years.  First, amounts increased about 6-fold 
between 2000 and 2001.  The next large jump was when amounts increased about 4 times 
between 2004 and 2005.  In the years preceding the jumps the amounts were relatively 
stable in a range.  After the jumps the amounts were relatively stable as well.  
The amount of money involved in the annual omnibus reprogramming 
action does not appear to have any trend.  Between 1999 and 2003 the omnibus was 
always below one billion dollars.  In every reprogramming year from 2004 through 2006, 
funds approved in the omnibus were well over one billion dollars.  Moving funds to 
execute two wars was the likely cause for the more than three-fold increase in funds 
approved in the omnibus reprogramming actions. 
When all of the reprogramming is viewed from the perspective of DoD’s 
budget authority, it seems the percentage of budget authority reprogrammed has been 
 42
relatively unchanged.  The percentage of budget authority reprogrammed has varied from 
as little as 4.2 percent in 1999 to as high as 5.4 percent in 2006.  While the total dollar 
amount that has been reprogrammed has increased, it has only kept pace with the growth 
of DoD budget authority.  This may indicate that reprogramming has not really changed 
much in the last eight years, but the method for executing reprogramming may have.  In 
1999 internal reprogramming accounted for 93 percent of all dollars reprogrammed.  The 
percentage decreased steadily to 55 percent by 2006. 
3. Amount of Funds Reprogrammed by Fiscal and Reprogramming 
Years 
a. Question 
As we have seen, when DoD conducts reprogramming it may move funds 
associated with the current fiscal year or past fiscal years.  Understanding how much 
money is reprogrammed for each fiscal year gives a sense of the magnitude of 
reprogramming actions.  Reprogramming of current year funds may indicate addressing 
needs brought about by current events.  Reprogramming of prior funds may indicate 
changes in the financial structure of programs such as cost savings or overruns.  For each 
reprogramming year how much money is reprogrammed for each fiscal year? 
b. Data Manipulation 
For each reprogramming year the data were sorted by the fiscal year of the 
reprogramming transaction involved.  Then the amount of money taken from each 
account for each fiscal year was summed.  The amounts taken from accounts rather than 
the amounts given to accounts were used because when the defense committees mark a 
reprogramming request, they typically only mark the paying account and do not mark the 
account acting as the payee.   
c. Presentation 
The amount of money reprogrammed for each fiscal year by 
reprogramming year is shown below in Table 8.  The reprogramming years are along the 
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horizontal axis while the fiscal years are along the vertical axis.  All amounts in the table 
are in thousands of then year dollars. 
 
Reprogramming Year 
FY 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
2006   21,744,552          
2005     2,597,467    16,035,382         
2004        422,124      5,321,441      18,457,860       
2003        447,941      1,836,871           762,918   20,017,615      
2002          63,500           66,547        1,709,875        248,156   17,312,225     
2001        269,600           62,058             21,143        615,917        206,879   13,716,367     
2000        335,100           17,979             16,975          23,924        576,195        235,245   10,117,848    
1999        215,000           17,046             13,253          30,903               530               979     2,472,792    14,589,664 
1998          18,200             1,419             14,346          62,734            3,237        104,341            1,250         704,956 
1997          36,900             4,234             15,169          12,887          36,947                 -             9,889         187,958 
1996                 -              3,223               7,579          18,109               217          61,506                 87             2,629 
1995          23,200                101               5,366          13,942                 12                 -             7,082                606 
1994                     -            19,231                  -            24,676 
1993              86,847          13,436                  -                 325 
1992              10,100          44,548                  -                 130 
1991                     -            42,718                  -                   50 
1990              18,033          38,498                  -                 917 
1989                      -             1,067    
1988                         310      
Table 8 Funds reprogrammed by fiscal and reprogramming year 
 
d. Description 
In every reprogramming year the amount of money reprogrammed was 
always the greatest in the current fiscal year.  The largest amount was $21.7 billion in 
2006, and the lowest amount was $10.1 billion in 2000.  As with the number of 
transactions for each fiscal year, the current fiscal year having the most funds 
reprogrammed makes sense.  Events occurring in the present tend to cause more 
reprogramming of current funds than funds with older fiscal years.   
For almost every reprogramming year, funds were reprogrammed for 
fiscal years ten years in the past.  A period of ten years makes sense because the 
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obligation period for the longest appropriations is five years and the period to spend those 
obligations is five years.  So after ten years, funds that were obligated would either need 
to be expended or reprogrammed so that the funds’ availability is not lost.   
In general the amounts of funds reprogrammed for each reprogramming 
year decreased with the number of years from the present fiscal year.  For the 
reprogramming years of 2004, 2003 and 2002 there were more funds reprogrammed for 
the fiscal years two years prior to the current fiscal year than for the one immediately 
prior.  These higher amounts could be explained by the reprogramming of RDT&E funds 
whose obligation period is about to close or the sweeping up of obligated, yet 
unexpended funds. 
In the 2005 reprogramming year there were more funds reprogrammed 
from the 2004 fiscal year than from the 2003 fiscal year.  With more than $5.3 billion 
reprogrammed, this was more than twice as much as the next largest reprogramming of 
funds two years old.   Three reprogramming years, 2006, 2005 and 2000, had higher 
amounts of one year old funds reprogrammed.  These three years’ funds ranged from 
three to 20 times as large as the other reprogramming years’ funds. 
4. View of Three Appropriation Types over Time 
a. Question 
A perception throughout DoD and the defense industry analysts is that 
investment accounts are consistently used to fund operations accounts.  This perception 
has been furthered at times by the necessary reprogramming of money from investment 
accounts to fund operations accounts when Congress is late to pass the annual defense 
appropriation bills.  By plotting the amounts of money reprogrammed from investment 
and operations accounts throughout the year, an understanding of whether investment 
accounts really are used to fund operation accounts can be developed. 
b. Data Manipulation 
Transactions from the 2006, 2004, 2002 and 2000, reprogramming years 
were selected for analysis.  The transactions associated with operations and maintenance, 
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procurement and research and development accounts were singled out for further 
analysis.  For each reprogramming year the transactions were put into chronological 
order.  Then with a starting balance of zero for each of the three transaction types, each 
transaction that added funds to an account was added to the balance while each 
transaction that reduced an account’s funds was subtracted from the balance.  The 
balance for each account type was then plotted along a timeline based on the transaction 
dates. 
c. Presentation 
The balances for operations and maintenance, procurement and research 
and development accounts are show for reprogramming years 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 
below.  The time periods covered by each figure are along the x-axes.  The running 
balance of reprogrammed funds is shown along the y-axes and displayed in thousands of 
then year dollars.  Operations and maintenance balances are shown in black, procurement 
















































































































































Figure 6 Flow of funds for 2004 RY 
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Figure 7 Flow of funds for 2006 RY 
 
d. Description 
During the 2000 reprogramming year the net increase for operations and 
maintenance grew to be about six times larger than the net increase for procurement and 
research and development.  Most of the year the procurement balance was slightly higher 
than the research and development balance.  The balance dropped below zero slightly for 
the period between September and the beginning of November.  Neither the RDT&E nor 
operations and maintenance balances ever dropped below zero.  In the beginning of June 
the balance for operations and maintenance decreased while the balances for procurement 
and research and development increased.  This was the only point on the figure where it 
was evident that one type of account benefited at the expense of another. 
The 2002 reprogramming year had characteristics similar to those of 2000.  
The balance for operations and maintenance was about ten times larger than those of 
procurement and research and development.  The operations and maintenance balance 
went up rapidly beginning in February and rose to a high of $8.9 billion before falling to 
$8.5 billion at the end of September.  The net increases in investment accounts were less 



















of April but recovered to $620 million by the end of the year.  At the end of September 
the procurement balance went up while the operations and maintenance balance went 
down. 
In the 2004 reprogramming year the operating and investment accounts 
once again had similar characteristics to those of 2000 and 2002.  The net increase in 
operations and maintenance accounts was about ten times that of the investment 
accounts.  The operations accounts increased steadily to about four billion dollars by the 
end of December and stayed relatively flat until May, when the balance increased steadily 
to the $10 billion end of year level.  There was no apparent period throughout the year 
where it was evident that one type of account was being used to fund another type of 
account. 
The 2006 reprogramming year was different from the previous three years 
analyzed.  The net increase to the operations and maintenance account never grew to any 
more than three times the net increase to investment accounts.  In previous years 
operations and maintenance had consistently been about ten times larger.  Also, at the 
beginning of the reprogramming year, the operations and maintenance balance was 
actually negative and the procurement balance was positive.  This is the first time this 
trait was observed.  By looking at the raw data, there was a direct relationship between 
the rising procurement balance and the falling operations and maintenance balance 
between October and February observed.  The procurement balance ended the year at 
about $3.5 billion, the highest of all four years studied. 
C. CONGRESSIONAL RESISTANCE TO REPROGRAMMING 
Reprogramming has provided the flexibility DoD believes it needs to execute its 
responsibilities.  However, there exists a constant tension between DoD and Congress.  
DoD always wants more flexibility for the execution of its budgets while Congress wants 
to assert and maintain control of its powers of the purse.  Congress can reassert its control 
through the approval process of prior approval reprogramming actions.  This section 
looked at how often Congress changes reprogramming requests and how much they 
change the proposed reprogramming requests. 
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1. Frequency of Congressional Resistance 
a. Question 
It is important to understand how often Congress resists reprogramming.  
Since Congress provides the original funding as well as the authority to reprogram funds, 
understanding when it restricts use of that authority can shape future requests.  
Congressional resistance occurs when a prior approval reprogramming is submitted and 
the action is either disapproved in whole or one or more of the line items are changed.  
Frequently, a committee will reduce the amount requested to be cut, but will leave up to 
the department which requirement will not receive the requested funding.  How often are 
prior approval reprogramming actions changed by the congressional committees that 
approve them? 
b. Data Manipulation 
For each reprogramming year prior approval reprogramming actions were 
counted except the omnibus reprogramming action.  Internal reprogramming actions were 
not included because the defense committees do not review them.  Any actions which had 
line items changed by one or more of the congressional committees were counted as 
being marked.  Prior approval reprogramming actions that were not marked by a 
congressional committee were counted as being left alone. 
c.  Presentation 
The number of prior approval reprogramming actions that were submitted 
in each reprogramming year and the number of them that were changed by the defense 
committees are displayed in Figure 8.  Data for the reprogramming years from 1999 to 
2006 are included.  The height of the data represents the number of reprogramming 
actions while the horizontal axis provides a timeline in reprogramming years. 
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Figure 8 Frequency of congressional resistance 
 
d.  Description 
The number of prior approval reprogramming actions more than doubled 
from 1999 to 2001, while the number of actions changed by congressional defense 
committees remained fairly constant.  After 2001, the number of prior approval 
reprogramming actions returned to 1999 levels in 2002, and then increased steadily 
through 2005 while the number of actions changed by Congress remained constant.  In 
2006, the number of prior approval reprogramming actions decreased significantly again.  
In all years except 2004 and 2006, the number of actions changed ranged from one to 
three regardless of the number of actions.  In 2004 and 2006, the number of prior 
approval reprogramming actions changed by Congress more than doubled any other year.  
The approval rate as a percentage of requests submitted ranged from a low of seven 
percent to a high of 37 percent.  Overall, about 85 percent of all prior approval 
reprogramming requests went unchanged.  In general, this shows the defense committees 
defer to the Defense Department’s judgment. 
There appears to be a pattern in the number of prior approval 
reprogramming actions submitted.  The pattern seems to indicate that prior approval 
requests increase for a few years, and then have a sharp drop, followed by an increasing 
trend again.  The trend may be correlated with the presidential election cycle.  Fewer 
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reprogramming requests may occur in the second year of a president’s term because it is 
really the first time the President’s budget is his.  The President is sworn in on January 
20th and his budget is due to Congress on the first Monday in February.  As a result 
during the President’s first year the budget is mostly complete and the President can only 
make modifications.  This pattern should be investigated more comprehensively in the 
future. 
2.  Magnitude of Congressional Resistance 
a. Question 
When congressional committees review reprogramming requests they may 
either approve in full, deny in full or mark to an amount they believe appropriate.  How 
much of the money requested that congressional committees deny gives an indication of 
the magnitude of congressional resistance.  How much of requested reprogramming funds 
are denied each year?  What is the average percentage marked?  Are there any trends in 
the marking of reprogramming requests? 
b.  Data Manipulation 
The sum of the data for transactions with an increase in accounts was 
higher than the amounts leaving accounts.  The difference between money going to 
accounts and money coming from accounts stems from how the defense committees mark 
up reprogramming requests.  Sometimes defense committees only reduce the funds for 
accounts being reduced and leave it up to the department to decide which items will not 
receive additional funding.  Other times the defense committees specifically reduce the 
amounts requested for increases.  As a result, all data used are from transactions 
associated with money leaving accounts were used with the exception of total number of 
transactions marked. 
For each reprogramming year the transactions that were marked were 
collected.  The numbers of transactions marked for each year were then counted.  Then 
the amount of money requested to be reduced from accounts was summed.  The amount 
of money approved to be reduced from accounts was summed.  The percentage of each 
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transaction marked was averaged.  The total approved was divided by the total requested 
in the identified transactions to compute the percentage marked. 
c.  Presentation 
The total amount of requested reprogramming that was denied is shown in 
Table 9 below.  The first column shows the reprogramming year involved.  The second 
column shows the total number of prior approval transactions for each reprogramming 
year.  The third column shows the number of transactions that were marked for each 
reprogramming year.  The fourth column is the total amount of prior approval 
reprogramming funds approved for the reprogramming year in then-year $K’s.  The fifth 
columns displays the total amount requested in the marked transactions while the sixth 
column shows the amount approved in those transactions.  The eighth column is the 
amount requested divided by the difference.  The last column is similar to the eighth 
column except that it is the average of the percentages marked for the transactions that 
were marked. 
Regression analysis was performed to see if there was any relationship 
between the number of transactions marked and the total number of prior approval 
transactions.  Regression was also performed to see if there was any relationship between 
the number of transactions marked and the amount requested.  Regression was performed 
to see if there was a relationship between the number of transactions marked and the total 
amount of prior approval reprogrammings approved. 










1999 110 33 1,076,370 151,022 25,924 125,098 83% 78% 
2000 180 78 881,043 1,005,198 338,594 666,604 66% 75% 
2001 216 55 3,261,337 726,732 377,782 348,950 48% 76% 
2002 115 17 1,659,954 822,353 716,251 106,102 13% 60% 
2003 170 5 3,169,857 851,878 758,878 93,000 11% 53% 
2004 271 51 4,630,251 763,488 171,354 592,134 78% 80% 
2005 301 42 9,812,373 1,507,101 595,998 911,103 60% 61% 
2006 390 119 11,304,073 5,016,098 1,398,652 3,617,446 72% 78% 
Table 9 Extent of congressional resistance 
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d.  Description 
The number of transactions varied greatly between 1999 and 2006.  
Transactions marked ranged from a low of five in 2003 to a high of 119 in 2006.  The 
percentage of all prior approval reprogramming transaction varied greatly as well.  Only 
3 percent of reprogramming transactions were marked in 2003 while 43 percent were 
marked in 2000.  Overall, about 23 percent of prior approvals reprogramming 
transactions were marked.  Regression showed that in general as the number of prior 
approval transactions increased, so did the number of marked transactions. 
In every year except 2000 the amount requested in the marked transactions 
was less than the total amount of approved transactions for all prior approval 
reprogramming.  In 2000, more money was requested in the marked transactions than 
was approved for all transactions.  The amount requested is very strongly correlated with 
the total amount approved.  As the total amount approved in all prior approval 
transactions went up so did the amount requested for the transactions that were marked. 
The amount which was marked varied significantly from year to year.  
The smallest amount marked was in 2003, when $93 million was cut from requested 
reprogramming.  The highest amount marked was in 2006, when $3.6 billion was cut 
from requested reprogramming.  A low of 11 percent of the funds reduced for marked 
transactions in 2003 with a high of 83 percent in 1999 was observed.  The percentage 
marked decreased between 1999 and 2003 and then increased through 2006.  The 
amounts cut from requests were strongly correlated with the total amount of all prior 
approval reprogramming requests approved.  As the amount of total amount approved 
went up, the amount of reprogramming cut increased as well. 
The average mark percentage is the average of the percentage marks for 
each individual transaction that were marked.  Percentages ranged from a low of 53 
percent in 2003 to a high of 80 percent in 2004.  The high percentage indicates that when 
defense committees mark a transaction they tend to reduce the amount significantly if not 
completely.  Of the 400 marked transactions, the amount reduced on average was 74 
percent. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. THE NATURE OF DOD REPROGRAMMING 
In some aspects reprogramming within DoD has changed over the last eight years 
while in others it has stayed the same.  Trends and events were evident in some of the 
data presented, and in others they were not.  The research was broken into three areas: 
frequency of actions, magnitude of actions, and congressional resistance associated with 
actions. 
1. Analysis of Reprogramming Actions and Transactions 
In general the number of reprogramming actions and transactions increased from 
1999 and 2006.  The increase in actions and transactions really started in the 2004 RY.  
The war in Iraq started in the spring of 2003, and likely had an impact on the number of 
reprogramming actions and transactions.  It was expected that the war would cause more 
reprogramming actions to fund the operations in Iraq and there would be an increase in 
the number of transactions associated with operating accounts.  Instead, the number of 
operating account transactions remained relatively constant over the eight year period. 
There were always more internal reprogramming actions than prior approval 
reprogramming actions.  Internal reprogramming actions do not require congressional 
approval and as such do not receive the scrutiny of prior approval reprogramming 
actions.  Only those reprogramming actions meeting specific criteria are required to have 
prior approval prior by the defense committees prior to implementation.  As such, more 
actions do not meet the criteria for prior approval than those that do.  Also, it is possible 
that services avoid using reprogramming actions that could draw the ire of someone on a 
defense committee and cause him or her to reject the proposed reprogramming action. 
While the number of transactions increased for both prior approval and internal 
reprogramming during the period studied, there was a larger increase in the number of 
prior approval transactions.  In fact, there was considerable variability in the number of 
internal reprogramming transactions from year to year, yet the 2004 and 2005 
reprogramming years had substantial increases from previous years.  The number of prior 
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approval transactions in the 2004 to 2006 period increased between 60 to 150 percent 
more than the previous years.  Also, the number of transactions included in the omnibus 
reprogramming action increased during the same period. 
This shift to more prior approval reprogramming transactions is probably a 
reflection of the increasing complexity necessary to fight a war and execute programs 
effectively.  When large operations, such as war, are carried out, large amounts of funds 
are needed.  If the operations are not planned well in advance or funding has not yet been 
appropriated by Congress, then funds must be moved from existing programs in the 
interim to fund the operations.  To meet those interim funding requirements, more 
reprogramming actions that meet the criteria for prior approval will be generated as a 
result of the dollar values involved.  Consequently, more reprogramming transactions are 
prior approval than internal. 
The average number of transactions per prior approval action also increased from 
1999 to 2006.  While both the number of actions and transactions increased, the number 
of transactions increased more.  Including more transactions in prior approval actions 
makes it more difficult to determine what tradeoffs are being made among different 
programs.  This may have been used as a tactic by DoD officials so that the request was 
less likely to be marked by the defense committees.  Or having more transactions could 
have just been a necessity to achieve the necessary funding.  Further research into what 
types of accounts were involved with prior approval actions having many transactions 
would help to clarify this point. 
It was expected that the months of August and September would be the busiest in 
terms of the number of reprogramming actions executed.  This expectation was based on 
the belief that the end of fiscal year sweep-ups would drive the increased reprogramming 
actions.  End of fiscal year sweep-ups occur when a program has budget authority that 
will expire if not obligated prior to the end of the fiscal year.  Toward the end of the fiscal 
year managers will identify those un-obligated funds and identify uses for those funds to 
be obligated. 
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In actuality the expectation was partially met.  For internal reprogramming actions 
August and September were busy months in terms of the numbers of reprogramming 
actions executed.  However, for prior approval reprogramming actions August and 
September did not have as many actions as expected.  Instead, the months of March, 
April and May were the busiest for prior approval actions.  The months of March, April 
and May were months that had many internal reprogramming actions as well. 
The process for approving prior approval reprogramming actions was the likely 
reason why there were not many prior approval reprogramming actions in August and 
September.  The length of time it takes to identify funds to be reprogrammed and have 
the proposed action decided upon within DoD and then by the defense committees is 
probably lengthy.  So lengthy is it that if the action was identified in August or 
September, the new fiscal year would start before the reprogramming action would be 
approved and could be implemented. 
The increase in the number of prior approval actions in March, April and May are 
likely the result of the mid-year review.  About halfway through the fiscal year programs 
are reviewed to determine if they are running under or over budget.  As a result of the 
mid-year review programs are identified to have funds moved out of, or into, to allow for 
better execution.  Movement of these funds requires reprogramming to be used.  Doing so 
during the middle of the fiscal year allows adequate time to have the requests approved 
by the defense committees. 
Internal reprogramming actions had two periods that had significantly more 
actions than other periods.  The periods of August and September and March, April and 
May both had high numbers of internal reprogramming actions.  August and September 
probably had higher actions as a result of end of fiscal year sweep-up activity while 
March, April and May had more actions as a result of the mid-year reviews.  Unlike prior 
approval reprogramming actions, internal reprogramming actions are not approved by the 
defense committees and consequently can be used as a tool at the end of the fiscal year. 
It was expected that if the normal defense appropriations were passed late then 
more reprogramming actions would occur before the appropriations bill to ensure 
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programs had enough funds to continue critical operations.  It was also expected that after 
the defense appropriations were passed late that there would be more reprogramming 
actions to move the funds back to the accounts from which they had borrowed.  Instead, 
the number of reprogramming actions in the months immediately before and after 
appropriations was varied.  It did not matter if the appropriations were the normal defense 
appropriations or supplemental appropriations.  In some instances there were more 
reprogramming actions before and after appropriations but in others there were not.  
Further study would be beneficial to developing an understanding as to why this 
occurred. 
While the number of operating account transactions stayed the same, the numbers 
of transactions for military personnel, procurement, housing and construction and transfer 
funds increased.  Increases in these transactions were not anticipated.  Paying for more 
personnel in a hazardous duty status and the activation of National Guard units likely 
caused the increase in military personnel transactions.  Even after the first year of 
combat, wartime personnel costs are funded by supplemental appropriations and are 
usually funded in a transfer account to be reprogrammed into personnel accounts.  
Likewise, procurement for more equipment being used in war as well as temporary 
housing and construction costs associated with the war led to the increase in 
reprogramming transactions.   
Typically, the majority of reprogramming transactions were used to reprogram 
current year funds.  The number of transactions decreased as the number of years from 
the current fiscal year increased.  It was expected that the current fiscal year would 
contain the majority of transactions since events driving reprogramming actions are more 
likely to affect present fiscal year funds more so than past fiscal year funds.  Transactions 
associated with previous fiscal year funds in many cases were the result of 
reprogramming un-obligated funds set to expire to other accounts so that the funds may 
be used.  One would expect to see transactions associated with research and development 
two years in the past because the length of this type of appropriation is two years.  The 
same logic follows for the other types of appropriations and their obligation timeframes. 
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The exception to the previous discussion occurred in the 2004 reprogramming 
year.  During that reprogramming year there were more transactions farther back in time 
than in any other reprogramming year.  This may have been the result of an extra hard 
look at programs looking to identify any available funds that could be used for the war in 
Iraq.  This argument is bolstered by the data shown in Table 1 showing that there was an 
increase in transactions associated with procurement and military construction accounts.  
These are the types of accounts having funds with obligation periods of many years. 
2. Analyzing the Money Involved with Reprogramming 
When taking an overall look at the eight appropriation types (O&M, MILPERS, 
RDT&E, Procurement, MILCON/Housing, Revolving Funds, Transfer Funds and Other 
DoD Programs) some observations about the amounts of funds reprogrammed into and 
out of these accounts were made.  There was not always a direct correlation between the 
number of transactions and the amount of money involved with each type of account.  
Some accounts had a net increase in funds while others had a net decrease. 
By far the accounts that had the most activity were the operations and 
maintenance accounts.  Not only did they have the most transactions, but they also had 
the most funds moving into and out of them.  These accounts had over $181 billion 
reprogrammed into them.  This was more than six times larger than the account with the 
next largest amount.  There was a net increase of $163 billion in operations and 
maintenance accounts over the eight year period. 
Operations accounts are subject to needing reprogramming more so than other 
accounts because events that occur tend to change to best laid plans.  Budgets are built 
with assumptions about specific operating conditions and tempo almost two years before 
they are executed.  By the time the budgets are actually executed and operations 
conducted, there are likely significant events having occurred that require changes to the 
operating budgets. 
The large net positive increase in the operations and maintenance account may be 
a reflection of the period studied.  It is suspected that a majority of the funds 
reprogrammed into the operations and maintenance account are a direct result of the war 
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in Iraq.  When Congress funds the war through supplemental appropriations they 
appropriate the funds into a transfer account.  The funds then have to be reprogrammed 
into the Operations and Maintenance account for execution of operations.  In the absence 
of war and supplemental appropriations it is expected that the amount of money 
transferred into the Operations and Maintenance account would be significantly less.  In 
fact, for the 1999 through 2001 reprogramming years, in which there were no war 
supplemental appropriations, there was only a net increase of $21.7 billion in operations 
and maintenance accounts.  This represents about $7 billion a year.  For the 2002 to 2006 
reprogramming years there was a net increase of $142 billion, or about $28 billion per 
year. 
While transfer accounts only accounted for about three percent of all 
reprogramming transactions, they had the second most money involved in 
reprogramming.  Transfer accounts had over $163 billion transferred out of them and a 
net negative flow of over $161 billion.  This imbalance of the amount of money involved 
and the number of transactions was a result of how the reprogramming actions are 
structured.  Most reprogramming actions with transfer funds had many transactions with 
fund increases, while there was only a large, single transaction reprogramming funds out 
of the transfer account.  These transactions are most likely a function of supplemental 
appropriations in general and not a reflection of reprogramming in post-9/11. 
Research and development was another account with incongruence between the 
number of transactions and the amount reprogrammed.  This account had the third most 
transactions, but only had the seventh most dollars reprogrammed.  This suggests there 
were many transactions with small dollar amounts.  One explanation may be that research 
and development programs may require only small changes to make a large impact.  
Also, there are many different research and development programs and many of them are 
not funded to a high dollar amount relative to operations and maintenance.  As a result, 
only small dollar amounts are needed to be reprogrammed for these programs to account 
for changes.  Consequently, there are lots of transactions having small dollar amounts. 
The amount of money reprogrammed through internal reprogramming was 
relatively unchanged over the period studied.  While the number of actions and 
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transactions varied, the amount of funds reprogrammed remained relatively constant.  On 
the other hand, prior approval reprogramming had some definite trends associated with 
them.  There was an increasing trend in the amount reprogrammed using prior approval 
reprogramming and there was also an increase in the number of prior them. 
It was surprising to see that the total amount reprogrammed using internal 
reprogramming was relatively unchanged during the eight year study period.  It was 
expected that there would be an increasing trend in the amount reprogrammed as a result 
of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The amount of internal reprogramming annually 
was between $12 and $17.8 billion.  Internal reprogramming accounted for the majority 
of the money reprogrammed in every year.  However, of the total amount reprogrammed 
each year, prior approval reprogramming became a larger portion of that total every year.   
The amount of money reprogrammed using the annual omnibus reprogramming 
action changed dramatically between 1999 and 2006.  In 1999, only $775 million was 
reprogrammed, but in 2006 over $3 billion was reprogrammed using the omnibus 
reprogramming action.  In fact, until the 2004 reprogramming year no omnibus 
reprogramming action was over $1 billion.  The increasing amount reprogrammed using 
the omnibus reprogramming action suggests that the services might be doing a better job 
of coordinating a majority of their reprogramming requests prior to the submittal to the 
defense committees.  However, that does not seem to be the case since the amount of 
prior approval reprogramming actions outside of the omnibus reprogramming action have 
increased as well.  Further study into why the amount reprogrammed in the omnibus 
reprogramming action has increased is warranted. 
The amount reprogrammed by prior approval actions that were not the omnibus 
reprogramming action increased from 1999 to 2006.  In 1999, there was only $300 
million reprogrammed, but by 2006, there was over $8 billion reprogrammed using prior 
approval reprogramming actions.  The increase was more pronounced in 2005 and 2006.  
One explanation may be that since the events of September 11, 2001, the number, size 
and complexity of operations in which the DoD is involved has grown continually.  This 
increase in operations causes more funds for not only operation accounts, but military 
personnel and investment accounts as well. 
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The total amount reprogrammed increased from 1999 to 2006, but stayed between 
4.2 and 5.4 percent of the total DoD budget authority.  The composition of the total 
amount reprogrammed changed over the period studied.  In 1999, internal 
reprogramming accounted for about 93 percent of all of the dollars reprogrammed.  The 
percentage decreased to about 55 percent by 2006.  An explanation for why prior 
approval reprogramming has become a larger fraction of total reprogramming is that as 
more reprogramming is needed, more of the reprogramming actions exceed the 
thresholds or meet the criteria for prior approval reprogramming actions.  As a result, the 
amount of internal reprogramming actions remains relatively constant while prior 
approval reprogramming increases. 
It was expected that the investment accounts (Procurement and RDT&E) would 
subsidize operating accounts, yet no such relationship was observed.  There was 
however, one instance where it appeared that operating accounts served to fund 
investment accounts.  Based on the results of this study it does not appear that investment 
accounts are being used to fund operating accounts.  However, just because the data do 
not bear this perception out does not mean it is not occurring.  The tradeoff between 
investment and operating accounts may be being made during budget development.  If 
that is the case then reprogramming for this reason would not be necessary. 
3. Congressional Resistance 
When the DoD sends a prior approval reprogramming action to the defense 
committees it may be met with resistance in the form of disapproval of the entire request, 
disapproval of specific transactions or reducing the amount requested in transactions.  For 
every reprogramming year except 2004 and 2006, there were only a couple of actions per 
year that received congressional resistance, regardless of the number of reprogramming 
actions.  In the 2004 reprogramming year one-third of all prior approval reprogramming 
actions were marked in some form by the defense committees.  In the 2006 
reprogramming year ten of 17 actions were marked by the defense committees.  It seems 
that there was relatively little congressional resistance in most years.  The Congress 
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during this time period had been labeled as a “Rubber Stamp Congress,” meaning that 
they rarely opposed anything requested by the executive branch (CNN, 2006).   
It appears that the 2004 and 2006 reprogramming years are anomalies where 
congressional resistance is concerned.  The 2004 reprogramming year may have had 
more resistance as a result of the funding sources attempted to be used to fund the Iraq 
war.  The 2004 reprogramming year was the first full year in which the Iraq war had been 
ongoing.  Perhaps this was the first series of attempts by the DoD to use programs which 
had traditionally been off-limits and the defense committees reasserted its control over 
the power of the purse by denying or reducing the amounts requested.  Another 
explanation may be that the shift was a function of those years being election years.  
Putting forth resistance may have been an attempt to distance themselves from the current 
administration. 
For the 2006 reprogramming year there was once again increased resistance.  
During the 2006 reprogramming year, the largest amount of funds for the entire study 
was denied by the defense committees.  For the marked actions, there was $5.0 billion 
requested, yet only $1.4 billion was approved.  The denial of over $3.6 billion was more 
than four times larger than in any other year.  Perhaps the defense committees viewed the 
funding provided in the supplemental appropriations as adequate and the reprogramming 
requests went beyond what they believed was necessary.  Further in-depth research of 
individual reprogramming actions would be necessary to determine if this was indeed the 
case. 
When the defense committees did decide to mark reprogramming requests, they 
did so in a fairly consistent manner.  The defense committees typically reduced the 
amount requested by an average amount of about 75 percent.  The total amount requested 
with transactions which were marked was fairly constant between 2001 and 2004.  The 
1999 reprogramming year had a very low dollar amount associated with the transactions 
that were marked.  This consistency could be a result of a defense committee holding the 
line on a particular reprogramming request type.  If that were the case however, one 
would expect the DoD would know this information in advance and decide not to submit 
requests they know would be likely to be marked in committee.  Another alternative is 
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the idea that the defense committees take a couple of actions each reprogramming year 
and mark them up for no other reason other than to show they are still exerting control. 
The 2002 and 2003 reprogramming years were different from the other 
reprogramming years.  Of the transactions marked during these two reprogramming 
years, there was only about a 12 percent reduction in the amount of funds requested.  
There were only five and 17 transactions marked in the 2003 and 2004 reprogramming 
years respectively.  In every other reprogramming year there were at least 33 transactions 
that had been marked.  The 2002 reprogramming year began shortly after the attack on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.  It could be the case 
that the defense committees did not want to give the appearance of impeding the 
President’s prosecution of the terrorists.  The same possibility exists for the 2003 
reprogramming year with the start of the war in Iraq. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
DoD classifies reprogramming into two major categories; prior approval and 
internal reprogramming actions.  Prior approval actions are submitted to the defense 
committees for approval before they can be implemented.  Internal reprogramming 
actions are audit-trail actions approved within the DoD.  Prior approval actions are used 
when certain criteria are met: reprogramming affects a congressional special interest 
item, involves the use of general transfer authority, certain thresholds exceeded or if the 
reprogramming begins a new program, increases quantities of a major end-item or 
terminates a program.  If none of the criteria are met then an internal reprogramming 
action is used. 
Reprogramming actions followed a cyclical pattern.  The patterns were different 
for internal and prior approval actions.  There were two periods of high activity for 
internal reprogramming actions.  The first period was in the months of August and 
September.  The second period was during March, April and May.  For prior approval 
actions there was only one period of time that had more actions.  Like the second internal 
reprogramming period, the high activity period for prior approval reprogramming actions 
were the months of March, April and May. 
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The reasons for the high activity periods were the end of the fiscal year and the 
mid-year review.  At the end of the fiscal year unobligated balances in expiring accounts 
are reprogrammed so that the funds may be used.  This only affects internal 
reprogramming because the prior approval process is too lengthy to be implemented 
before the end of the fiscal year.  During the mid-year review, programs are reviewed to 
determine if programs are executing under or over budget.  The mid-year review serves 
as a course correction for the funding of programs.  Both prior approval and internal 
reprogramming actions saw an increase in activity around the mid-year review period. 
In general there was an increasing trend in the number of reprogramming actions 
and in the amount of money reprogrammed annually.  The number of internal 
reprogramming actions varied between 58 and 116 but had no real trend.  The total 
amount reprogrammed annually using internal reprogramming remained relatively 
constant at about $15 billion.  The typical internal reprogramming action was about $26 
million and consisted of eight transactions.  Generally speaking, the number of prior 
approval actions increased during the period studied.  On average there were about 26 
prior approval reprogramming actions annually.  The typical prior approval 
reprogramming action was about $32 million and consisted of about four transactions. 
Operations and maintenance accounts were involved in the most transactions and 
had the most money involved.  Procurement accounts had the second most transactions 
while transfer funds had the second most money reprogrammed.  The amount of money 
involved when reprogramming operations and maintenance and transfer accounts was 
more than five times larger than any other account type.  The study was not conclusive 
but the author believes may be a function of the period studied.  The extensive amounts 
of money transferred from transfer accounts to operating accounts to fight the current 
conflict in Iraq heavily influenced these figures. 
Congress usually approves most prior approval reprogramming actions.  The 
Congress of the last six years has been labeled as a “Rubber Stamp Congress” and the 
data seemed to back that up.  Aside from the omnibus reprogramming action, the defense 
committees only marked a couple of actions each year.  Transactions in every omnibus 
reprogramming action were consistently marked by the defense committees.  When the 
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defense committees did decide to mark a transaction they did so fairly decisively.  On 
average transaction amounts were reduced by 70 percent when the defense committees 
marked them. 
The information presented in this study can be used as a baseline for further 
research.  This thesis developed a structured methodology for studying reprogramming 
and brought about new questions to be answered.  Future research should focus on 
answering the questions uncovered in this study.  Prescriptive conclusions may be made 
to assist in DoD’s budgeting process using the information presented in this study and 
from future research. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
While this study answered some questions, it perhaps raised even more.  There 
were occurrences of dramatic shifts in the frequency and amounts of reprogramming 
actions that were difficult to explain.  It is unknown whether the data presented is 
“normal,” or if the data shifted from “normal” as a result of the ongoing wars.  It is also 
unknown if the level of congressional resistance would be different during periods where 
a balance of power between political parties exists. 
Based on the data presented in Table 7, a dramatic change occurred during the 
2004 reprogramming year.  The amounts reprogrammed by the omnibus reprogramming 
action and prior approval actions in general increased substantially.  There was no 
apparent reason for the increase.  Investigation into what caused the increase in the 
amount of money reprogrammed using prior approval reprogramming could shed light on 
the subject.  Perhaps there was a single decision or policy change that led to the change in 
how the DoD reprogrammed funds. 
As a corollary to the above area, investigation into why the amount 
reprogrammed as a percentage of total budget authority has remained relatively 
unchanged.  While the total amount of funds reprogrammed increased, the increases came 




reprogramming actions remained relatively constant.  Investigation into why the amount 
reprogrammed by internal reprogramming remained relatively unchanged should be 
conducted. 
A significant portion of the data may be strongly influenced by the current 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  There has not been this amount of operational 
activity since the Vietnam era.  To see how strongly the data were influenced by current 
operations, a study of corresponding data from a period before the one studied in this 
thesis could be done and then compared.  However, it may be more difficult obtaining the 
reprogramming data for previous years as it may not be in digital format or even 
available. 
If data were collected from another time period, there would also be an 
opportunity to discern congressional resistance associated with political party affiliation.  
For example, from 1990 to 1992, there was a Republican president and a Democratic 
controlled Congress.  From 1992 to 1994, there was a Democratic president and a 
Democratic controlled Congress.  From 1994 to 2000, there was a Democratic president 
and a Republican controlled Congress.  The last combination occurred during the period 
covered by this study.  Additional research may find that there are differences in 
congressional resistance depending on the combination presidential/congressional 
control. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While this study was extensive, it was not exhaustive.  This study probably 
uncovered more questions than it answered.  Therefore, more research on reprogramming 
should be conducted to further develop an understanding of this field.  Future research 
should focus on answering the questions uncovered and provide recommendations about 
future reprogramming activity. 
Collecting the data for this study was slow and tedious.  The information was 
manually entered into an EXCEL workbook after transcribing the information from a 
PDF file.  It would have been much easier if the DoD (C) maintained a database of 
reprogramming information in a format that is more conducive to data manipulation. 
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While reprogramming data from 1999 to present is available on the DoD (C) 
website, it would be beneficial to have reprogramming data from earlier years be made 
available.  Having this information would enable future studies to look at reprogramming 
at different periods in our history.  As such, then reprogramming could be compared and 
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